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Introduction 
This paper investigates the adoption, structure, and function of dispute resolution 
procedures in the nonunion workplace.  Whereas grievance procedures in unionized workplaces 
have been an important area of study in the field of industrial relations, research on dispute 
resolution procedures in nonunion workplaces has lagged behind.  As a result, our knowledge of 
the development of nonunion procedures remains relatively limited.  Similarly, with a few 
noteworthy exceptions (e.g. Lewin, 1987, 1990), our knowledge of workplace grievance activity 
is almost entirely based on research conducted in unionized settings.  Given the major 
differences in the institutional contexts of union and nonunion workplaces in the United States, 
existing ideas about workplace dispute resolution developed in the unionized setting will likely 
require significant modification in order to understand dispute resolution procedures and activity 
in the nonunion workplace.  Issues relating to dispute resolution in the nonunion workplace are 
of increasing importance to public policy given the combination of continued stagnation in levels 
of union representation and mounting concerns over rising levels of employment litigation in the 
courts.  Knowing what nonunion dispute resolution procedures look like and how they function 
will help answer the question of what role these procedures may play in the future governance of 
the workplace. 
In the contemporary unionized workplace, issues of the adoption and structure of 
grievance procedures spark relatively little controversy.  Development and diffusion of union 
grievance procedures dates to the period of the 1940’s War Labor Board and the post-War 
consolidation of stable collective bargaining.  The structure of union grievance procedures has 
exhibited remarkable stability since that period, with virtually all current unionized workplaces 
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having multi-stage grievance procedures culminating in arbitration (Eaton and Keefe, 1999).  By 
contrast, nonunion dispute resolution procedures vary widely in both their adoption and 
structure.  As many as half of all nonunion workplaces continue to lack any formal procedures 
for the resolution of employee complaints (Feuille and Chachere, 1995).  Among workplaces that 
do feature formal dispute resolution procedures, these procedures vary in basic features such as, 
who is the final decision-maker under the procedure, whether employees are permitted 
representation, what complaints can be brought under the procedure, and what criteria are used to 
decide disputes (Feuille and Delaney, 1992; Feuille and Chachere, 1995).   
An initial issue that needs to be addressed with regard to nonunion procedures is what 
factors shape the diversity in the structures that are used to resolve disputes in the nonunion 
workplace.   As with other areas of industrial relations and human resource practices, 
environmental pressures and human resource strategies provide two broad categories of factors 
that may influence the development of nonunion dispute resolution procedures (Barringer and 
Milkovich, 1998).  Among environmental pressures, concerns about workplace disputes giving 
rise to litigation and the desire to avoid unionization by providing workers with a mechanism for 
resolving complaints have both been suggested as possible motivations for nonunion 
organizations to introduce procedures (Feuille and Delaney, 1992).  Some have argued, however, 
that union substitution no longer plays a major role in the introduction of nonunion procedures 
due to declining unionization levels and reduced fear of organizing activity (Feuille and Delaney, 
1992).  Others have suggested that the extent of actual litigation pressures on organizations are 
also often exaggerated, though fear of litigation may provide an important rhetorical device in 
convincing managers to adopt procedures as an appropriate organizational ‘best practice’ 
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(Edelman, 1990; Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger, 1992; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger, 1999).  
An alternative category of explanations suggest that nonunion procedures are adopted as part of 
human resource strategies that emphasize fostering positive relations between employees and 
management.  Arguments from the perspective of organizational justice theory suggest that by 
providing greater procedural and distributive justice in decision-making, nonunion procedures 
may reduce turnover and foster greater employee commitment and effort (Olson-Buchanan 
1996).  In addition to the question of what is the respective importance of environmental 
pressures and human resource strategies in the adoption of procedures, an additional question to 
be addressed is whether there is any interaction between these factors in how procedures are 
developed.   
A second set of issues relating to nonunion dispute resolution procedures concern how 
they are used by employees and what is their function in the workplace.  The traditional image of 
nonunion procedures was that they were little used by employees due to their deficiencies in the 
area of due process and were largely ineffective as workplace institutions (Slichter, Healy, and 
Livernash, 1960).  More recent research has found examples of nonunion procedures with more 
regular employee usage, though at levels well below that of typical union grievance procedures 
(Lewin, 1987, 1990).  In addition to differences in usage levels, the way in which nonunion 
procedures function may differ significantly from union grievance procedures.  In particular, the 
absence of the institutionalized presence of the union in representing employees means that in a 
nonunion procedure employees are much more dependent on the goodwill of management in 
resolving complaints.  The question of how nonunion procedures function in practice is closely 
linked to the issue of what impact these procedures have on the operation of the workplace.  For 
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unionized workplaces, persistent high grievance rates have been seen as a major part of 
embedded high conflict patterns of industrial relations, interfering with the operations of the 
workplace and reducing productivity (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1994).  By contrast, for 
nonunion procedures the initial question is not excessive conflict, but rather whether the 
procedures have enough of an impact on the management of the workplace to make any real 
difference for employees.   
In this paper, I investigate these questions of the formation and function of nonunion 
dispute resolution procedures through a case study of the procedures adopted at the multi-
divisional manufacturing firm TRW.   TRW provides a useful case for investigating the possible 
direction of development of nonunion procedures due to its relatively extensive set of procedures 
for its nonunion employees.  Concerning the adoption of procedures, the results of the case study 
will provide support for the importance of both environmental pressures and human resource 
strategies.  Furthermore, it will suggest that these are not simply alternative explanations for the 
adoption of procedures, but rather operate as complimentary factors that interact in shaping the 
structure of nonunion procedures.  On the issue of the usage and function of nonunion 
procedures, the results of the case study suggest that employees do use at least this type of more 
developed nonunion procedures, but that concerns remain as to due process limitations in the 
operation of the procedures.  At the same time, the procedures do appear to have had some 
significant impacts on the operation of the workplace.  Most notably, procedures in some 
instances led to increased negotiated resolution of workplace disputes and modification of 
existing practices or procedures, despite features in the design of the procedures directed at 
limiting this type of outcome.  Lastly, the case study results reveal a major division between 
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white-collar and blue-collar employee groups in both the development and operation of 
procedures.  The contrasts found between these two groups indicate the need to be careful about 
making generalizations about the nonunion workforce, which can be characterized by high 
degrees of diversity in employment conditions and outcomes.       
 
Methodology 
 As noted above, this paper investigates the adoption and use of nonunion dispute 
resolution procedures through a case study of procedures at the multidivisional American 
manufacturing company, TRW.  In the context of dispute resolution, TRW provides a useful case 
for understanding the development of nonunion procedures due to the relatively extensive and 
elaborate nature of the procedures that the company has adopted.  Rather than being a typical 
case, it was selected as a ‘best practice’ case in order to investigate the impact of nonunion 
procedures in an organizational setting where particularly strong efforts have been made to 
ensure the widespread adoption and use of the procedures.  This is not to suggest or advocate that 
organizations should necessarily adopt the practices that are described here, but rather that we 
can better evaluate the possibilities and limitations of nonunion procedures from a ‘best practice’ 
case than from a case with less extensive procedures.  By analogy, past research was able to 
learn much about the impact of employee involvement in the workplace from studying GM’s 
innovative Saturn division (e.g. Rubinstein and Kochan 2001) and about employee ownership 
from the unusually active worker ownership structure used at the Rath packing company 
(Hammer and Stern, 1986) not because these were typical cases, but rather because they were 
‘best practice’ cases that provided strong examples of the phenomena being investigated.   
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The primary data sources for the case study presented in this paper are interviews 
conducted by the author at the company in 1997-98 and examination of documents relating to the 
procedures.  Individual interviews were one to one-and-a-half hours and followed a semi-
structured format.  Primary interview subjects included human resource managers at the 
corporate, divisional, and plant level, and in-house employment and labor law counsel.  
Secondary information sources included descriptions of the company’s procedures and 
experience with their usage that have been presented by TRW managers at conferences (e.g. 
Boxer 2000) and a profile of dispute resolution procedures at TRW was included in a 1997 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report as one of five private sector companies providing 
leading examples of the adoption of nonunion dispute resolution procedures (GAO, 1997).   
The primary focus in the research was on the management side.  The reason for this focus 
was that management decision-making was central to the research questions being investigated; 
in particular decisions of management determined the adoption of the procedures, the structure of 
the procedures, and how they were operated.   Although additional perspectives on the issues 
examined were obtained from union and plaintiff attorney sources, the primary focus on the 
management side is a limitation of the research emphasis that should be recognized.    A more 
general research caution is inherent in the use of a ‘best practice’ case methodology.  As is the 
case for this study, in following a ‘best practice’ case methodology the researcher selects a 
research site to represent a strong example of a particular phenomenon.  The danger then 
becomes that the researcher will excessively identify with the interests of the group or 
organization being studied and this will in turn influence the research findings.  This is not to 
suggest that what the researcher views as ‘best practice’ cases should not be studied, but rather 
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that the researcher needs to be aware of and recognize potential biases.  In the present case, as a 
researcher I approached this case study with the recognition that I was examining what I viewed 
as likely a best case scenario for nonunion procedures.  With that recognition in mind, the case 
study was written with an effort to identify both the potential weaknesses and the strengths of the 
company’s procedures and with this initial caution to readers that they are reading about a case 
that was deliberately selected as a potential ‘best practice’ case for the phenomenon in question.    
 
Case Background 
The diversified manufacturing company TRW has occupied a prominent role in 
American industrial relations history and research.  During the earlier part of the 20
th
 century, 
under its former name of Thompson Products, the firm was one of the leading exemplars of the 
“welfare capitalist” movement among American companies.  Despite organizing efforts by the 
United Auto Workers during the 1930’s and 40’s, only a few of the company’s plants became 
unionized during the period of expansion of unionization following passage of the Wagner Act.  
In his landmark study of the survival and continuation of welfare capitalism during the post-war 
period, Modern Manors, Sanford Jacoby (1997) uses Thompson Products, along with Eastman 
Kodak and Sears, as a critical case study of a company that continued to follow this management 
philosophy during an era when it was thought to have disappeared from the landscape of 
American business.  Thompson Products’ ability to maintain its predominantly nonunion status 
during the post-war period was not due solely to the benefits offered to employees by welfare 
capitalism.  Jacoby (1997) notes that, unlike Eastman Kodak and Sears, Thompson Products was 
subject to intensive union organizing, to which the company often responded with more heavy-
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handed tactics.  Although unions succeeded in organizing some TRW plants during the post-war 
period, by the 1990’s, only three or four of the company’s American plants were unionized. 
The current TRW is a diversified manufacturing company, headquartered in Cleveland, 
Ohio.  Organizationally, it is divided into two business groups.  One is the Automotive group, 
which accounts for 60% of total sales.  Auto parts were the traditional center of the company’s 
business, though it has remained dynamic in this area in recent years through expansion into new 
product areas such as air bags.  The other major group in the firm is TRW’s Space, Defense and 
Information Technology business group, which contains two units: space and defense; and 
systems integration.  In sharp contrast to the more traditional manufacturing setting of the 
Automotive group, the Space, Defense and Information Technology (SDIT) group produces 
highly sophisticated products with a predominantly professional workforce.  Among, the space 
and defense unit’s primary products are commercial and military satellites.  In addition, it is the 
primary contractor for such major defense contracts as the airborne laser being produced for the 
U.S. Air Force.  The other major unit within this group is systems integration, which provides 
management and information system services for complex operations, such as a major 
government research projects.   
An important factor in understanding developments at TRW is the values and human 
resource orientation of the company’s management.  During the 1930’s and 40’s  Thompson 
Products’ retention of welfare capitalist policies was heavily influenced by the employee 
relations values of the company’s president, Frederick C. Crawford (Jacoby, 1997).  This 
orientation continued during the 1960’s, when the company began experimenting with new 
behavioral science concepts in the management of its workforce, such as innovative 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 
compensation and selection systems.  In addition, in 1977 the company opened a new nonunion 
team-concept plant in which employees were assigned to teams rather than specific jobs and 
compensation was all-salaried based on a pay-for-knowledge system (Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie, 1994).  These human resource policies were developed in the context of the 
company’s continuing commitment to avoiding unionization.  In particular, the innovative 
practices were concentrated in the company’s newer nonunion facilities and not extended to its 
few unionized facilities.  More recently, the company’s current human resource management 
orientation is reflected in strong public advocacy by its management of such policies as gain-
sharing, pay-for-productivity and employee involvement (Daily Labor Report, 1994 DLR 13 
d11).  It is also noteworthy that the executive vice-president of human resources at TRW is a 
member of the firm’s executive committee, indicating the relatively strong role of human 
resource management considerations in the firm’s decision-making. 
Dispute resolution procedures formed part of the high commitment human resource 
policies introduced at TRW facilities in the 1960’s and 70’s.  These procedures initially 
consisted of provisions for written complaints to be filed with and reviewed by management.  
These procedures primarily provided a more formal and systematic structure for management 
review of employee concerns, rather than a more independent process of dispute resolution.  In 
addition, committees composed of employees were established in plants to bring complaints of 
general concern to management.  Although providing a mechanism for raising employee 
grievances, a weakness of these procedures was that they did not provide a structure for the 
resolution of disputes beyond the normal management decision-making process.  However, 
during the 1990’s a series of factors led to the development of more complex dispute resolution 
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procedures that afforded greater independence from the management chain-of-command in the 
adjudication of employee grievances.   
Rather than a single process, development of nonunion procedures at TRW in the 1990’s 
actually involved two distinct processes that led to the introduction of two different types of 
procedures, peer review procedures and nonunion arbitration procedures.  Under peer review 
procedures, employees who are peers of the employee filing the complaint sit on a panel that 
decides the grievance.  By contrast under the nonunion arbitration procedures a neutral arbitrator 
hears and decides claims by employees against the company concerning violation of employee 
legal rights.  Although there were common elements in the development of these procedures, the 
development and introduction of each procedure involved a distinct decision-making process in 
response to separate pressures and motivations.  Furthermore, once adopted the peer review and 
nonunion arbitration procedures retained distinctions in their operation, usage, and functions.  
For this reason, in the subsequent sections the development and use of the two types of 
procedure will be examined separately, beginning with the peer review procedures, then turning 
to the nonunion arbitration procedures.  In this respect, the procedures serve as an embedded unit 
of analysis within the organizational case that permits comparing and contrasting two different 
processes of procedure development within the same firm.   
 
Peer Review Procedures 
In the early 1990’s, TRW’s Vehicle Safety Systems division introduced peer review for 
the first time into dispute resolution procedures in the company.  Vehicle Safety Systems (VSSI) 
is a division of the automotive business group.  Its primary products are air bags and seat belts.  
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This is a relatively new product area for the company, with the initial part of the division 
entering the company through a 1984 acquisition.  With the expansion of the use of air bags in 
automobiles, the division grew rapidly from a $2 million business in 1984 to an over $2 billion 
business by the late 1990’s.  All of VSSI’s American plants are nonunion and are generally 
recently constructed facilities, with relatively young workforces.  The total workforce of the 
division is 16,000 employees, half of whom are located in the United States, with the remainder 
spread across plants in other countries, including Mexico, Canada, and Germany. 
Introduction of a peer review procedure was first proposed at VSSI during the early 
1990’s based on a series of interrelated reasons why the practice would be advantageous to the 
division. The first rationale was that peer review would serve as a “counter-defensive” move to 
avoid VSSI’s plants becoming a target for unionization.  Although VSSI had managed to avoid 
unionization of its American plants, with the continued strength of the UAW in the industry its 
plants remained a potentially attractive target for organizing.  The perception of managers in the 
division was that their employees were aware of what employment conditions were like in the 
unionized plants in the auto industry.  As a consequence, management actively monitored what 
was going on in the unionized sector of the industry to ensure that the wages and conditions of 
employment in VSSI’s nonunion plants were roughly comparable.  Peer review was offered as a 
component of that strategy of union substitution, which would provide a better substitute for 
union grievance procedures than the division’s existing complaint procedures.  A closely related 
rationale offered for the introduction of peer review was that it would respond to the expectations 
of the division’s workforce.  As noted earlier, employees in the division are relatively young, 
averaging 25-35 years of age in most plants.  Management perceived these employees as 
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expecting a high involvement, team-oriented culture in the workplace, what one manager 
described as the “video generation who want a say in the business.”  Peer review was proposed 
as a way to respond to these perceived employee expectations that would complement related 
human resource practices such as performance- and group-based compensation and self-directed 
work teams.   The complimentarity with VSSI’s overall high commitment human resource 
strategy was the third rationale offered for the introduction of peer review.  Peer review was 
advocated as being in keeping with the “spirit of a modern company” that TRW was seeking to 
achieve in its human resource strategy.  Peer review was offered as a new “best practice” in the 
area of dispute resolution procedures, which would be appropriate for TRW to adopt.   
It is worth noting that although peer review procedures were adopted in other companies, 
most prominently at General Electric, in the 1970’s, they were not part of the initial set of human 
practices adopted when VSSI’s first facilities were opened in the mid-1980’s.  Instead, peer 
review first came under consideration as a new type of best practice in the 1990’s.  This reflects 
the significant lag times often involved in the diffusion and adoption of new practices, a factor 
important to consider in examining the causes of change in employment relations.  In addition, it 
reflects the importance of changes in the set of options for behavior under consideration by 
management.  Taking a strategic choice view of employment relations (Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie, 1994) suggests that to understand change it is necessary to consider the specific 
alternatives under consideration at the relevant point in time.  The environmental factors that 
ultimately led to the introduction of peer review were already present in the 1980’s.  However it 
was only in the 1990’s that VSSI management brought into consideration the option of 
introducing peer review as a new best practice that would help avoid the environmental threat of 
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union organizing, respond to the expectations of its workforce, and complement its other human 
resource practices.  
Although peer review was presented as a policy that complimented VSSI’s human 
resource strategy, its initial proposal met resistance from both senior and lower-level line 
managers.  In particular, line managers were concerned about the prospect of having to justify 
their actions to employees on the peer review panels.  A key factor in convincing management to 
adopt peer review was the assurance offered to line managers that human resource managers 
would be there to provide support to line managers when they went into peer review.  However 
concerns remained and were exacerbated when the first peer review hearing resulted in the 
overturning of a line manager’s decision.  Although this decision exacerbated line management 
concerns about peer review, it ultimately proved fortuitous in helping establish early on to 
employees that management would respect the decisions of the panels, even if unfavorable.  
The peer review procedure was introduced at VSSI in 1992 as an additional procedure to 
which employee disputes could be taken to on top of existing open door policies at plants.  Usage 
of peer review was restricted, however, to employee complaints about final warning or 
termination decisions, excluding terminations due to elimination of the employee’s job or work 
reduction.  Peer review panels consist of five members, two managers and three peer employees.  
A new panel is formed for each appeal.  The definition of peer is grievant specific, so if the 
employee is a production worker, the peer employee panelists will be selected from all eligible 
production workers in the plant.  In order to serve on a peer review panel, an employee must 
have been employed for at least one year, not be under corrective counseling, and not have 
received disciplinary action or corrective counseling in the past year.  Additional exclusions from 
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panel membership include: family members of the grievant; anyone in the chain of command of 
the grievant; members of human resources; and “persons who have a vested interest and/or 
conflict of interest in the outcome of the meeting.”   
The members of the panel are chosen at random from the pool of eligible peer employees 
and managers by the grievant.  The employee first picks four names from the pool of eligible 
managers, chooses two of the managers picked to serve as panel members, then selects one as an 
alternate, and discards one name.  Then the employee picks five names from the pool of eligible 
peer employees, chooses three employees to serve as panel members, selects one as an alternate, 
and discards one name.  Service on the peer review panels is voluntary and panelists may not 
serve on two consecutive peer review panels.  If a grievant requests, one of the panelists may be 
chosen from a pool specifically composed of members of a protected minority class of which the 
grievant is a member.  As a general rule, there must be at least 15 members in each pool from 
which panelists are chosen.  If there are not enough members in any group at a facility, 
employees from other locations may be included in the pool to ensure sufficient numbers.  This 
is a particularly concern where there are insufficient numbers of employees in a protected 
minority class to ensure representation on the panel of peers of the same racial or ethnic group as 
a minority complainant. 
For each panel, a human resources representative serves as a “facilitator” (Schwarz, 
1994).  The role of the facilitator is to handle the administration of the procedure, organize 
meetings, maintain files, and provide assistance to the panel.  In addition to organizational and 
record keeping duties, the facilitator has a more substantive role in the procedure in meeting with 
the grievant and supervisor to explain the procedure, determining any conflict of interest 
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questions in the panel selection, and gathering any data or information requested by the panel.  
The importance of the role of the facilitator is enhanced by the instruction in the procedure that 
they “may be called upon to provide policy interpretation and general factual information 
concerning precedents, but he/she is not expected to give detailed information regarding other 
specific corrective actions, appeals, or precedents.”  Given this significant role of the facilitator 
in the peer review procedure, only senior human resources representatives are allowed to 
perform this function.  In addition, any human resource representative involved in the decision 
under appeal is not allowed to act as the facilitator. 
Peer review proceedings are commenced by the employee filing a peer review request 
form stating whether it is a final warning or a termination case, the nature of the employee’s 
concern, and the company policy in question.  Requests for peer review must be filed within 
three working days of the final warning or termination decision being appealed.  Following the 
filing of the request form with human resources, a panel will be convened in a time not to exceed 
45 days from the request.    
Prior to the hearing, peer review panelists are given a day of training consisting of 
instruction on the procedure and on the conduct of hearings.  A major focus in the training is to 
emphasize the confidentiality of the procedure.  Management had strong initial concerns that 
employees would be reluctant to use peer review if they thought that confidential information 
about them would be spread around the plant by the panelists.  In practice, this has not been a 
problem with the panels.  During the training period, the panels are also asked to select their own 
panel leader.  The panel leader is responsible for chairing the hearing and making procedural 
decisions on issues such as the calling of witnesses.  The facilitators generally recommend that a 
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peer employee lead the panel and this is the usual practice. 
At the commencement of the peer review hearing, the human resources facilitator 
introduces the subject of the complaint.  The employee is then given the opportunity to present 
his/her case, including presenting any documents or witnesses that support his/her case.  The 
employee’s presentation may be oral, written, or both, however no internal or external employee 
representative is permitted to participate in the hearing.  Following the employee’s presentation, 
the supervisor who made the decision being challenged is given an opportunity to justify his/her 
actions, including any documents or materials supporting his/her position.  The supervisor must 
present his/her case on his/her own, also without assistance of a representative.  The panel can 
cross-examine witnesses presented by the employee or the supervisor, as well as call any 
additional witnesses they want to hear from.  The panel is entitled to examine company files and 
records, as well as to “seek advice from experts within the Company regarding policy 
interpretation, etc.”  
Following the presentations of the employee and supervisor and when all information the 
panelists wish to review has been heard, the employee and supervisor are excused from the 
hearing room and the panel deliberates.  During training, the panelists are instructed that they are 
limited to reviewing the application of company policies and cannot change policy.  However, 
the procedures also note that policies are only guidelines and cannot cover every situation.  Thus, 
panelists are also instructed that “a common sense approach must be used by the panel members 
in determining the final outcome.”  Then, after discussion of the information presented at the 
hearing, the panel makes its decision by secret ballot.  The panel leader conducts the secret 
ballot, with all panelists voting.  Ballots are opened one by one until a majority of votes are cast 
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to accept or reject the employee’s appeal.  Remaining ballots are not opened and all ballots are 
destroyed after the counting of the votes.  The unusual procedure of not opening the remaining 
ballots once a result is reached protects panelist independence by reducing the possibility of 
determining which way any individual panel member voted – e.g. if four of the five panel 
members admitted to voting for or against an appeal it would be possible to identify the 
dissenting panel member on a 4-1 majority vote.  However, in some cases it prevents the 
employee from knowing what the final vote count was on the panel – e.g. if the first three votes 
opened were to deny the appeal, the employee will not be able to find out if the final vote count 
would have been 3-2, 4-1, or 5-0.  If an appeal of a final warning is accepted by the panel, the 
warning is removed.  If an appeal of a termination is accepted by the panel, the termination is 
reversed and the employee reinstated with retroactive pay and benefits.   
Although the first decision from a VSSI peer review panel accepted the employee’s 
appeal, the majority of subsequent decisions were in favor of upholding the supervisor’s 
decision.  From 1992 to 1997, only 10 of 160 employees who took cases to peer review were 
successful.  The cases where employees were successful in appealing to peer review panels often 
involved failures of management to follow the exact procedural details of their own rules, such 
as the form and timing of warnings, rather than the content of the complainant’s conduct.  The 
division intentionally limited the panels to considering whether or not company policies were 
correctly applied, though the human resource managers expressed some surprise at the degree to 
which employees on the panels have held management to the letter of the rules in the conduct of 
discipline and terminations.  This may reflect a reality that if peer employees are placed in a 
structure where the only basis on which they can overturn management decisions is for lack of 
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compliance with company rules, they then turn to less flexible interpretations of management 
behavior under the rules in order to obtain the leverage necessary to accept appeals.   
Although employees have not had a high success rate at hearings, peer review may have a 
broader impact on the behavior of line and human resources managers.  Given the possibility of 
having to justify their decisions to a peer review panel, managers reported having to be more 
careful in making termination or final warning decisions.  Peer review is thus seen as having an 
indirect effect on the behavior of managers in making them more accountable and keeping them 
on their toes.      
 
Nonunion Arbitration Procedures 
Although both represent alternatives to traditional management review in dispute 
resolution, the development of nonunion arbitration and peer review at TRW involved responses 
to different environmental pressures involving very different groups of employees.  In contrast to 
the union substitution and human resource strategy motivations that led to the introduction of 
peer review in VSSI, the development of TRW’s nonunion arbitration procedure was a response 
to changing patterns of employment litigation against the firm.  In addition, whereas peer review 
was first introduced in the auto parts section of the company, nonunion arbitration was 
developed primarily in response to events in TRW’s Space, Defense, and Information 
Technology (SDIT) group. 
In contrast to the traditional manufacturing plants of the automotive business group, the 
SDIT group operates extremely high technology facilities employing highly skilled workers.  
Among the best known of the products of the group’s space and defense unit was the NASA 
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probe Pioneer 10, the first probe to reach Jupiter and the first human made spacecraft to escape 
the gravity of the solar system. On a less ethereal front, the group is building the first tactical 
lasers for the Army and the Air Force, and is a leader in the area of battlefield information 
systems.  This type of product leads to a strikingly different production facility setting from 
traditional manufacturing.  For instance, at the group’s main “Space Park” location in Redondo 
Beach, California, one of the production labs is a single production facility in which around 150 
engineers and scientists work on producing a single satellite at a time.  In some respects, these 
facilities resemble a high technology version of a shipyard, with each product being worth 
millions of dollars and production occurring in an almost craft-like fashion. Overall, sixty 
percent of the group’s workforce is classified as exempt professional and managerial employees.  
Until the early 1990’s TRW had experienced very little employment litigation.  In part, 
this was likely due to the limited nature of exceptions to employment-at-will.  However, a major 
additional factor was that the company gave employees effective lifetime employment, a practice 
reflective of the historical welfare capitalist philosophy of the firm.  This effective lifetime 
employment policy was ruptured in the early 1990’s when the SDIT group engaged in large-
scale layoffs in response to the contraction of the aerospace industry following the end of the 
Cold War.  Although the contraction of the industry may have created the economic necessity for 
the layoffs, it also made their impact particularly hard for the affected employees.  With the 
whole aerospace industry in contraction, many of the laid-off employees were unable to quickly 
find alternative employment.  Given the inevitable questions of fairness surrounding the 
dismissal of large numbers of employees, particularly those who believed the company had 
promised them lifetime employment, a major surge in employment litigation followed the 
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layoffs.  The ability of employees to engage in litigation was enhanced by the expansion of 
substantive employment rights during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, particularly in California, 
which increased the willingness of plaintiff attorneys to take on employment cases.  As one 
manager graphically described the situation, they were “laying off employees when employment 
lawyers were starting to advertise their services on billboards at the side of highways.”   
At the same time as these developments were increasing the pressures from employment 
litigation upon the company, changes in the law of arbitration provided new opportunities to use 
alternative dispute resolution procedures to avoid litigation.  In the United States Supreme 
Court’s landmark 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the 
court had held for the first time that rights contained in employment statutes, in that specific case 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, could be subject to mandatory arbitration under an 
arbitration agreement.  Although the following decade would be filled with decisions attempting 
to sort out the many implications of Gilmer, what the decision did for the first time was open the 
door to the possibility that companies could adopt nonunion arbitration procedures that would 
serve as an alternative to litigation through the courts for claims against them by their employees 
(Stone, 1996, 1999).  One advantage of nonunion arbitration procedures was that the employer 
could design the type of procedure it desired to fit its organizational objectives.  Perhaps most 
importantly though, arbitration provided a mechanism to avoid being subject to the uncertainties 
and potentially large damages of the jury system.  Although a competent arbitrator might be 
quite willing to find against the company where the employee had a valid claim, the general 
perception among management was that arbitrators would not be likely to award the type of 
extremely high damage amounts designed to punish companies that juries occasionally awarded.  
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Damages would also be further reduced by the potential for arbitration to occur much more 
quickly than litigation, thereby preventing damages from accruing to the same amounts as could 
happen during slower moving court proceedings.   
Recognizing the potential impact of these developments, the group’s labor and 
employment counsel wrote a memo to TRW’s senior management suggesting that the recent 
Gilmer decision had opened the door to using a nonunion arbitration procedure to avoid litigation 
and resolve these disputes at much lower cost.  Following the memo, a management team was 
put together at the corporate level to investigate the development of an alternative dispute 
resolution procedure to handle employment disputes that might lead to litigation.  The team 
included representatives from legal, human resources, and communications departments and was 
led by a vice-president of human resources.  The team spent six months, occupying its members 
virtually full-time, investigating the question of what dispute resolution policy to adopt.   
During its investigations, a major dividing point emerged within the team over the 
question of how to make sure any agreement establishing a nonunion arbitration procedure was 
enforceable against employees.  Legal department members of the team were concerned that an 
arbitration agreement had to be clearly enforceable to make sure of protecting the company 
against potential employment litigation.  To do so, they proposed that employees be required to 
sign arbitration agreements, either at initial hiring or as a condition of receiving salary increases 
or stock options.  Although the courts would likely enforce arbitration agreements without any 
such additional consideration for the agreement beyond continued employment, legal counsel 
recommended this more conservative approach, which had been followed by another aerospace 
company that had just introduced a nonunion arbitration procedure.  The human resources 
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members of the team were strongly opposed to this proposal.  They argued that it would lead to 
the dispute resolution procedure being viewed as an anti-employee move, which would conflict 
with TRW’s overall human resource strategy of enhancing employee commitment and 
involvement.  In particular, they objected that whereas other companies might require employees 
to sign arbitration agreements to get bonuses and stock options, this was inconsistent with the 
philosophy of employment relations at TRW.  
The decision on how to handle the problem of ensuring any procedure was binding and 
enforceable became the crucial stumbling block in TRW’s development of its nonunion 
arbitration procedure.  After nine months of debate, the issue eventually had to be resolved by 
the company’s General Counsel and its Executive Vice-President of Human Resources, who 
sided with the view that the nature of the arbitration procedure had to be made consistent with 
TRW’s overall human resource philosophy.  The final design decision reached was that the 
nonunion arbitration procedure would be mandatory and binding on the company, but that it 
would be mandatory but non-binding for the employee.  The employee would be required to take 
any legal dispute arising from employment through the arbitration procedure, however if the 
employee did not accept the arbitrator’s decision they would be free to proceed to litigation.  The 
decision to make the arbitration decisions non-binding for employees makes TRW’s procedure 
virtually unique among nonunion arbitration procedures.  Indeed, it is worth remembering that 
the key reason Gilmer led to the expansion of nonunion arbitration was that it allowed for the 
implementation of procedures that would produce binding arbitration awards, eliminating the 
possibility of taking statutory employment claims to litigation.  Despite having been inspired to 
consider introducing a nonunion arbitration procedure as a result of Gilmer offering the 
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possibility of using it to avoid rising litigation, this decision meant that TRW would be 
relinquishing one of the primary advantages of arbitration to employers.  
With the issue of the nonbinding status of the procedure finally resolved, a company 
policy directive was issued for the implementation of the new dispute resolution procedures 
(TRW Human Resources Memorandum No. 10, January 1, 1995).  Although the policy directive 
required the establishment of new procedures and set out basic features that had to be included in 
each procedure, the format of the actual procedures was left up to the individual divisions of the 
company.  The use of a company directive allowing a degree of discretion to individual divisions 
reflects both the decentralized business group and divisional organization of TRW, as well as the 
diversity between different parts of the company.  Under the directive, each division was 
required to establish a dispute resolution procedure covering: involuntary terminations that could 
form the basis for a claim in the courts; claims of discrimination or harassment based on 
protected status; and claims of constructive discharge.  Individual divisions could provide that 
other types of disputes were covered by the procedure, but a number of types of disputes had to 
be excluded from coverage.  The excluded categories included: benefit or pension claims; 
workers’ compensation; unemployment compensation; claims by the company for injunctive 
relief; and “the establishment or modification of TRW’s policies or procedures”.  Certain due 
process features had to be included in the procedures.  Employees would have the right to 
representation by counsel.  A basic entitlement to discovery of relevant documents and 
deposition of one individual for each side could be expanded on order from the arbitrator.  
Remedies equivalent to those available in court could be ordered by the arbitrator.  The arbitrator 
would be required to provide a written decision stating a summary of the claims, the remedies 
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ordered, and the reasons for the award.  As had been decided, the decision of the arbitrator would 
be binding on the company, but not binding on the employee.  However, the company reserved 
the right to introduce the arbitrator’s decision as evidence in any subsequent litigation.  Initially, 
the directive provided that the costs would be split, but that the employee’s contribution would 
be capped at two days base pay.  If the employee were successful, the company would pay the 
entire costs.  This provision was later changed so that employees would only pay a $100 filing 
fee based on subsequent court decisions rejected the imposition of the costs of employer 
mandated nonunion arbitration procedures on employees.   
As noted above, an interesting feature of the company directive is that it left the format of 
the procedure up to the division.  Prior to the company directive on alternative dispute resolution 
procedures, the individual divisions of TRW had a variety of internal complaint procedures.  
These ranged from simple open door policies to the complex peer review procedure in the VSSI 
division described above.  The company directive led to both the introduction of new arbitration 
procedures and a coincident enhancement of many of the internal complaint procedures.  These 
collateral changes in internal complaint procedures reflect an interesting process in which the 
focusing of organizational effort on improving existing dispute resolution procedures led to 
changes beyond those that inspired the initial initiative.  This suggests that organizational change 
is not a continuous process of adaptation to environmental pressures and internal imperatives, but 
rather that there is a discrete process in which the forces that overcome organizational inertia in a 
particular area can lead to a series of attendant changes.   
One of the divisions that introduced more general changes to its dispute resolution 
procedures in conjunction with the introduction of nonunion arbitration was TRW’s Systems 
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Integration Group (SIG).  Prior to the introduction of arbitration, SIG had a simple grievance 
procedure in which employees could lodge written complaints with senior management, who 
would either accept or reject the complaint.  Accompanying the introduction of arbitration, SIG 
established a new three-stage dispute resolution procedure.  The first stage, “management 
review” consisted of the internal complaint procedure.  The employee would begin the first stage 
by presenting a written statement of the dispute to the immediate supervisor.   
If unresolved, the next part of stage one would be for the complaint to be reviewed by a 
higher-level manager who had not been involved in the decision that was the subject of the 
complaint.  During these two parts of stage one the facility’s human resources manager would 
provide internal mediation to try to resolve the dispute.  If unresolved, the employee could take 
the dispute to stage two, “appeals committee/mediation”, which provided two mutually exclusive 
options.  In the first option, the complaint could be reviewed by an appeals committee, consisting 
of a five member panel of fellow employees with the senior human resources director serving as 
a non-voting chair.  The appeals committee was a peer review type of panel, though unlike the 
randomly selected VSSI panels, in SIG employees could nominate their fellow employees to 
serve on the pool from which the committee is drawn.  The employee selected three members 
from the pool and management selected the remaining two.  The other option in stage two was to 
have the complaint brought to an external mediator who would attempt to facilitate a negotiated 
resolution of the complaint.  As will be discussed later, after a period of experience with the 
procedure, stage two was modified to eliminate the appeals committee option due to lack of 
employee usage.  If the complaint was unresolved at stage two, the employee could proceed to 
stage three “alternative dispute resolution”.  Where the employee selected the appeals committee 
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option in stage two, they were required to participate in external mediation as an initial part of 
stage three.  If the complaint was unresolved in mediation, the final part of stage three was 
arbitration.  The arbitrators are chosen from American Arbitration Association lists of 
employment arbitrators.      
For disputes involving allegations of sexual or racial harassment or termination, the 
employee had the option to bypass stage one and/or stage two.  Disputes involving discipline for 
violation of sexual or racial harassment policies or legal and ethical conduct policies had to be 
taken directly to stage three mediation and arbitration.  The inclusion of the appeals committee 
and mediation options in the SIG procedure is particularly noteworthy.  The combination of 
appeals committees and mediation provide an additional dispute resolution structure within the 
division that goes beyond the basic nonunion arbitration procedure required under the company 
directive to help shield against litigation.  As will be described in more detail below, these 
additional new institutional structures may have particular importance for the process of 
resolving disputes within the firm. 
The other divisions of TRW adopted a range of combinations of elements in their 
procedures.  In contrast to the multi-stage procedure at SIG, with its appeals committee and 
mediation options, the procedure introduced for staff at TRW corporate headquarters simply 
provided for arbitration of legal claims.  Within the Automotive group, the Valve Division 
introduced both peer review and arbitration procedures in response to the corporate directive.  
Whereas at VSSI, the division adopted a similar approach to SIG and introduced mediation and 
arbitration as additional stages to its dispute resolution procedure, supplementing its existing 
peer review panel procedure.   
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Although the automotive business group has a larger workforce, employees within the 
SDIT group made greater use of the new mediation and arbitration procedures.  During the first 
three years after the introduction of the new procedures, from 1995 to 1997, out of a total of 
seventy-two mediation and arbitration cases at TRW, fifty-five were in the Space, Defense, and 
Information Group.  The vast majority of these claims were either resolved or abandoned during 
or after the mediation stage, with only three of the seventy-two claims during this initial three-
year period going to arbitration.  A range of different types of cases were brought to mediation 
and arbitration during this period, including: 27 layoffs involving employees in protected groups; 
20 wrongful discharge claims of all types; 7 disputed applications of company policies or 
discipline short of termination; 5 Americans with Disabilities Act claims; 5 claims of sexual 
harassment or discharges for sexual harassment; 4 promotion denials or demotions; 2 Equal Pay 
Act claims; and 2 failures to rehire following layoffs.     
With the majority of claims being resolved or abandoned at mediation, this stage assumed 
particular importance in the impact of the new procedure.  The experience with mediation was 
very positive for management, with most cases being resolved quickly and at low cost in 
mediation.  Time to resolve cases in mediation averaged only 3-4 months from the filing of the 
initial claim.  The average cost to management of resolving cases in mediation has been 
remarkably low, at around $2000 per case.  However, this figure is based on the direct monetary 
costs of settlements to the company, which does not include indirect costs to the company and 
often understated the value of the remedy to the employee.  A number of the settlements in 
mediation involved non-monetary remedies.  Reinstatement of terminated employees, adjustment 
of the application of policies, and finding new jobs for employees within the company were 
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common non-monetary elements in settlements that provided substantial benefits to 
complainants without direct monetary costs to the company.        
Employees used attorneys in mediation in only around half of the cases.  This may reflect 
an employee perception that they did not need representation at this stage in the procedure or that 
it was to their advantage to resolve their complaint quickly and cheaply without incurring the 
additional expense of an attorney.  However it is also possible that employees may have felt that 
bringing an attorney into the proceedings would be viewed as overly confrontational and 
negatively affect their future career in the company.  Whatever the motivation of the employees, 
it is of concern that employees may have been settling potential legal claims in mediation 
without the benefit of consultation with legal counsel.   
An interesting additional development in the area of representation is that a number of 
complainants brought representatives other than counsel with them to mediation.  In some cases, 
spouses accompanied the complainant to mediation.   In one instance, the complainant’s priest 
attended mediation to assist the employee.  Although it is difficult to judge the effect of these 
non-attorneys on the mediation process, they introduce a new and potentially significant element 
into the dynamics of the dispute resolution procedure.  In many cases these non-attorney 
representatives were very forceful in pressing the complainant’s position at mediation, more so 
than the complainants themselves. 
In addition to the direct resolution of cases, the introduction of mediation and arbitration 
had important effects on the management of employment relations at TRW.  For the in-house 
labor and employment counsels it led to a shift towards sending more of their time on proactive 
work and less reacting to developments in litigation.  One attorney described having shifted from 
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spending 60 percent of working time before the introduction of the procedures on litigation of 
cases, to spending 80 percent of working time after their introduction on counseling managers 
and helping human resources deal with employee complaints.  A major part of shifting to a more 
proactive focus was the ability to respond to disputes more quickly.  The past experience of the 
company had been that cases would take a couple of years to come to trial, by which point the 
manager involved might have left the firm.  The company might also have initially accepted the 
manager’s account of events, but then subsequently it was demonstrated at trial that the manager 
was engaged in illegal conduct and the manager’s behavior had continued on unchecked for the 
interim period causing further harm and mounting damages.  With less than a year being taken to 
bring cases to mediation and arbitration, the company was able to take remedial action more 
quickly and managers were more likely to be promptly held responsible for the consequences of 
their actions.  
 
Analysis 
 The development of peer review and nonunion arbitration procedures at TRW were the 
product of a combination of external pressures and internal management decisions that led the 
company to establish these new structures governing employment relations within the firm.  
Institutional environmental pressures and management strategies are often seen as alternative 
explanations for the development of organizational structures and practices.  Yet in this instance, 
the factors of environmental pressures and management strategies worked together in 
determining the direction of development of procedures.  In a period of declining unionization, 
deregulation, and globalization, institutional forces are often viewed as being of diminished 
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significance in determining the content of employment relations, particularly in the United 
States.  However it is striking that in the case examined here, which involved a company that is 
in many respects an exemplar of a ‘High Performance’ or ‘High Commitment’ approach to 
managing the workforce, institutional pressures played an important role in shaping 
organizational practices.  Furthermore, this was not only the case in the ‘old’ industrial context 
of automobile parts manufacturing where unions still have a substantial pressure, but also in the 
‘new’ context of the high tech aerospace sector where litigation pressures create a similar 
disciplining pressure on management to that of unions in the older context.  
Yet it would also be incorrect to solely emphasize the institutional pressures involved and 
downplay the significance of management strategies.  Neither union organizing nor litigation 
threats necessitate one specific response from management; in either case there was a range of 
responses the company could take.   In each instance, the particular response to the 
environmental pressure that management chose was a product of the company’s overall human 
resource strategy.  In the context of the potential for union organizing activity, the choice of 
practices such as the adoption of peer review procedures provides a union substitution approach 
that fits with a high commitment strategy, as opposed to the alternative of simply relying on 
suppression of organizing drives.  Similarly, in adopting an alternative dispute resolution 
procedure to respond to litigation pressures, the company could have taken an approach of 
simply requiring employees to arbitrate claims and designed a procedure that lacked significant 
due process protections.  In this case, the decisions to introduce more elaborate procedures with a 
major mediation component and, especially, to make the arbitration procedure non-binding for 
the employee were a product of the desire to balance protection of the company from litigation 
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with a human resource strategy that emphasized fostering high commitment and trust levels with 
its workforce.   
 Whereas there is a strong common thread in the interaction of environmental pressures 
and management strategies in the development of the peer review and nonunion arbitration 
procedures, the most striking contrast in this study involves the dynamics of procedures for 
white-collar and blue-collar employees.  Even though the study examined employees within the 
same company with a common orientation to human resource strategy, the patterns of 
development and usage of dispute resolution procedures were distinct and different.  For the 
blue-collar employee workforce in the automotive group, the dominant environmental pressure 
was the threat of union organizing, with litigation by employees playing no significant role.  By 
contrast, for the white-collar employee workforce in the SDIT group, employment litigation was 
the dominant environmental pressure, with union organizing threats being non-existent and 
irrelevant.  The contrasts in types of environmental pressure produced different directions of 
development of dispute resolution procedures to respond to the specific nature of the threat 
involved.  To respond to the increase in litigation activity among the white-collar workforce in 
SDIT, adoption of the nonunion arbitration procedures provided a mechanism to transfer these 
claims into an alternative dispute resolution structure that could produce faster and cheaper 
resolution of claims, while substantially reducing the threat of the uncertainties inherent in the 
jury-driven litigation system.  In contrast, in responding to the threat of potential union 
organizing and related employee expectations for fair treatment among the blue-collar employee 
workforce of the automotive group, peer review procedures provided a mechanism for employee 
involvement in the area of dispute resolution that could offer a better alternative to union 
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grievance procedures than simple management decision-making in responding to complaints. 
 The contrast between white-collar and blue-collar employee groups in the development 
and structure of dispute resolution procedures was also reflected in how the procedures were 
used.  Although peer review procedures were available to both blue-collar and white-collar 
employees in the automotive divisions where it was adopted, in practice it was used almost 
exclusively by blue-collar employees.  Even more strikingly, when peer review was offered as an 
option that could be used instead of mediation in the procedure adopted for the SIG division’s 
white-collar workforce, the peer review option was used so infrequently that the option was later 
dropped from the procedure.  The explanation offered within the division for this lack of usage 
of the option was that the white-collar employees perceived that mediation would provide them 
with a more independent dispute resolution processes than peer review.  One of the particular 
concerns with peer review for many white-collar employees is that their effective peer group 
includes employees who are in management or on career tracks leading into management.  If the 
peers on the panel bring a managerial perspective to the dispute resolution process, much of the 
distinctiveness of peer review compared to a grievance procedure in which a board composed 
entirely of managers hears the complaint is lost.  This difference has broader implications when 
we consider the differing nature of employment relations for white-collar and blue-collar 
employees.  Traditionally industrial relations theory and research has emphasized a sharp divide 
between labor and management as two separate actors in the industrial relations system.  In the 
nonunion context studied here this analysis held up well in looking at the blue-collar employee 
workforce, but broke down in looking at the white-collar employee workforce where the 
employees did not necessarily identify with their fellow employees as a group with common 
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interests in opposition to managers within the company.  For these white-collar employees, 
external mechanisms of the courts and independent neutrals in dispute resolution provided the 
supporting institutional structure for them to further their interests, rather than a structure internal 
to the workforce of the company such as organization either in the stronger institutional form of 
a union or in the weaker institutional form of worker participation in peer review procedures.    
 Two major criticisms that have been leveled at nonunion dispute resolution procedures 
are that they are lacking in due process protections and that usage of them by employees tends to 
be at very low levels.  If the TRW procedures represent a ‘best case’ example among current 
nonunion procedures, what does it tell us about these criticisms?  In the area of due process 
protections, the most negative picture of nonunion procedures is not supported by this study.  In 
both the peer review and nonunion arbitration procedures, substantial protections are included to 
enhance the neutrality of the decision-makers, ranging from the jury-like selection procedures for 
peer review panelists to the use of arbitrators and mediators provided by reputable neutral service 
providers.  Balanced against the features aimed at ensuring neutrality of decision-making is the 
reality that these are procedures structured by management that limit how far decisions can go in 
affecting organizational rules and procedures.  Types of complaints are limited under both types 
of procedures, with nonunion arbitration and mediation restricted to potential legal claims and 
peer review to disciplinary and dismissal decisions that are alleged to violate company policies 
and procedures.  An area of concern particular to the peer review procedures is limitations on the 
ability of parties to bring representatives to the panel hearings.  Although this restriction applies 
equally to the supervisor who made the decision being challenged, the absence of employee 
representatives is a significant weakness from a due process perspective.  In general, the overall 
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picture of the procedures is one of a reasonable degree of due process protections, but at the 
same time with some substantial limitations on the procedures designed to protect the company.   
 When we turn to the usage of the procedures, the more dire pictures of nonunion 
procedures again appear unwarranted.  Employees used both the peer review and nonunion 
arbitration procedures to a substantial degree, albeit at a rate well below usage of many union 
grievance procedures.  Although employee win rates were not high under the peer review 
procedures, employees continued to use them frequently and in a number of cases where 
management decisions were overturned were able to continue successful careers with the 
company.  Indeed compared to the unionized context, the relatively low win rates in the peer 
review procedures may be somewhat misleading given that there is no effective check on the 
ability of an employee to file a complaint.  Whereas unions typically undertake an evaluation of 
the strength of a grievance in deciding whether or not it is worth taking the complaint to 
arbitration, under peer review the employee alone decides whether or not to proceed.  Given peer 
review is a relatively quick and low cost procedure for the employee it is unsurprising that 
employees would be willing to take a chance on bringing relatively weak complaints to peer 
review whereas a union might not consider it worth investing the costs of arbitration on a similar 
weak grievance.   
 It is important to recognize that the most significant effects of these types of dispute 
resolution procedure may lie in their impact on the general conduct of employee relations by 
management, rather than on the resolution of specific cases.  In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
some of the strongest concerns about the introduction of peer review came from line 
management concerned about having their decisions challenged and reviewed by the panels.  
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Indeed, managers noted that one of the main impacts of the adoption of the peer review 
procedure was to increase the time and care taken in reaching and executing decisions to 
discipline and dismiss employees.  Viewed from this perspective, the procedures served as a tool 
for human resources within the organization that helped ensure line managers were actually 
following the policies adopted by the company directed at ensuring fair treatment of employees 
in the workplace.  The nonunion arbitration procedures had a similar impact on helping promote 
fairer treatment of employees by managers, particularly due to the more rapid resolution of 
complaints.  Given that a manager was likely to have his or her decisions reviewed in a much 
shorter time frame than had previously been the case, the probability that improper actions would 
come to light and be remedied was increased.  On a broader level, an interesting development 
was that in some instances employee complaints under the procedures led to modification and 
improvement of organizational practices and procedures.  For example, following a complaint 
that indicated a weakness in an employee relocation policy, the policy was changed to fix the 
problem, improving the assistance provided to employees.  This occurred even though the 
procedures themselves specified that decisions could not modify company policies and suggests 
the utility of the procedures as organizational learning systems for nonunion organizations 
through which complaints reveal problems and weaknesses in policies and practices that might 
not otherwise be identified.         
 
Conclusion 
This case study set out to investigate the adoption, structure, and function of dispute 
resolution procedures in the nonunion workplace.  The case examined here does not represent the 
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situation in the typical nonunion workplace, rather it was selected as a ‘best practice’ case study 
to investigate a stronger example of the development of this type of procedure and to see the 
possible direction of developments in this area.  One of the motivations for this investigation was 
to consider the degree to which nonunion dispute resolution procedures have the potential to 
provide some element of fairness and voice in the context of a workforce where union 
representation has declining reach.  The answer from this study is that nonunion procedures can 
serve a partial function in enhancing fair treatment and employee voice in the workplace, but the 
degree to which they will serve this function is conditional on both the continued existence of 
external institutional pressures that provide an incentive to companies to adopt procedures and 
the strategic orientation of nonunion companies in managing their workforces.  The absence of 
either factor will reduce the probability of the development of effective dispute resolution 
procedures in the nonunion workplace.  It is significant that even in this setting of a ‘best 
practice’ case where the human resource management orientation of the firm was likely to be 
especially focused on ensuring fair treatment in the workplace, environmental pressures from 
litigation and unions provided the initial impetus for the introduction of the nonunion procedures.  
If environmental pressures are a key factor in the adoption of nonunion procedures in the ‘best 
practice’ case setting where we would expect human resource management strategies to play a 
stronger role, then we should anticipate that environmental pressures will be even more critical 
for ensuring fair treatment in the more typical ‘non-best practice’ nonunion workplace.  
A second lesson from the study is that promoting effective nonunion procedures requires 
different factors for different parts of the labor force.  Whereas an institutional solution of 
promoting the continued vitality of union representation and collective bargaining is clearly of 
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importance for the blue-collar labor force, other solutions, in particular a robust litigation system 
combined with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that enhance rather than undermine 
rights, are necessary to deal with the problems of white-collar segments of the labor force.  For 
industrial relations research and theory this suggests that while the traditional ideas of ensuring 
strong institutions in the governance of employment relations remain relevant, they need to be 
adapted and applied to different types of solutions if they are to be effective across the whole 
labor force rather than one segment of it.  A similar challenge is posed from an industrial 
relations perspective in the findings from this study that while these nonunion procedures clearly 
have their weaknesses and limitations, they also are serving an important role for nonunion 
employees within the organization in giving them a structure that can be used to challenge unfair 
decisions and helping to shape how managers deal with employees in the workplace.  Although 
not a strongly institutionalized structure for governance of employment relations of the form 
seen in American unionized workplaces with their collective agreements and grievance 
arbitration procedures, neither does this appear as a situation of unchecked managerial discretion.  
Rather the combination of external pressures and the company’s development of an internal 
institutional structure through these dispute resolution procedures creates a situation that can be 
described as a semi-institutionalized structure for governance of employment relations.  If this 
type of semi-institutionalized structure is viable and effectively excludes external actors such as 
national unions from the workplace, then it poses a major challenge to the conventional 
industrial relations system based on strongly organized workplace representation through 
collective bargaining.  Questions that will need to be answered in relation to the development of 
this type of semi-institutionalized governance structure include:  how sustainable are these 
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procedures; how widely will they diffuse across different organizations; and what is the role of 
employee representation in relation to these procedures?  For the union movement, this last 
question will be particularly critical if they are not to abandon prospects for providing 
representation across a growing segment of the labor force.        
 
 
 
 
 
Afternote:  Subsequent to the period covered by this study, in 2002 TRW was acquired by the 
major aerospace company Northrop-Grumman.  While the former TRW Space, Defense, and 
Information Technology (SDIT) group became part of Northrop-Grumman, the TRW automotive 
parts group became an independent firm under the name TRW Automotive.  The implications of 
the acquisition and division of the company for the future of the dispute resolution issues 
described in this study are yet to be determined, though the shift in corporate ownership may not 
mean a drastic shift in approach to employee relations.  Northrop-Grumman is itself known for 
its longstanding nonunion grievance procedure that has used arbitration as its final step since 
the 1940s, so it is by no means clear that the acquisition will result in a major shift in the 
character of the procedures in the former SDIT group.  However, the potential impact of this 
corporate acquisition is a reminder of the importance of both management strategies and firm 
history in determining the path of evolution of employment relations within organizations.    
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